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ED NOWOGROSKI INSURANCE, INC. V. RUCKER': IS
THE MEMORY RULE JUST A THING OF THE PAST?
I. INTRODUCTION
As a general rule, an employee who has not signed an agreement
not to compete is free to engage in competitive business upon leaving
employment. 2 The former employee may freely use general knowledge,
skills, and experience acquired under his or her former employer in his
new employment. 3 Even without an enforceable covenant not to compete,
however, the employee remains under a duty not to use or disclose trade
secrets acquired in the course of previous employment to the detriment of
the former employer.4 Many businesses invest a great deal of time and
money in developing extensive customer lists, which are essentially
compilations of market data to be used to gain a competitive advantage
over other businesses.5 Businesses who make large investments in their
trade secrets desire to protect their confidential information and will take
the appropriate steps to pursue former employees who misappropriate
valuable trade secrets.6
There are contradictory social and economic policy considerations
to consider in analyzing a trade secrets issue.7 On one hand, a business that
has spent considerable amounts of money and time to develop trade secret
' 137 Wash. 2d 427, 437 (1999).
See id. at 437. The existence of a contract protecting trade secrets does not

2

preclude separate cause of action in tort under provisions defining trade secrets. Id. Terms
of a contract may be relevant, however, to such issues as existence of protectable trade
secret or creation of a duty of confidence. Id.
3 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 757 (b) (1939) (stating general matters of
public knowledge or general industry knowledge cannot be appropriated as secret).
4

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 42 (1995); see also ROBERT

107 (Aspen
Law & Business 2000) (1997). To qualify for trade secret protection, information must not
be generally known, must be valuable, and must not be disclosed. Id.
5 Henry J. Silberberg & Eric G. Lardiere, Eroding Protection of Customer Lists and
Customer Information Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 42 Bus. LAw 487, 487 (1987)
(mentioning especially true in industries that depend on salespersons or customer contact to
conduct business). Id.
6 See id. (stating massive volume of litigation concerning protection of customer
information exists.)
7 See Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 272 I. App. 3d 580, 590 (1995)
(citing LG Industries, Inc. v. Robert P. Scott, 49 ll.2d 88, 93 (1971)).
P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
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advantages over its competitors should receive protection against the
misappropriation of the information by a former employee who obtained
the information while in a position of confidence and trust.8 On the other
hand, an individual should be entitled to pursue the particular occupation
that he or she chooses in a free society, even if the occupation is in the
same industry as that of his or her former employer. 9 This Note will
address the trade secret protection that is afforded to customer lists and,
more specifically, whether a customer list that is retained in an employee's
memory qualifies as a trade secret. The Note will focus on the recent
decision in Ed Nowogrowki Insurance, Inc. v. Rucker,10 where the court
rejected the "memory rule" of agency law and stated that it was
inconsistent with promoting commercial ethics and fair dealing."
II. ARE CUSTOMER LISTS PROTECTABLE AS TRADE SECRETS?
A customer list can qualify as a protected trade secret if it meets the
criteria of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA").12 Forty-one states
and the District of Columbia have adopted the UTSA. 13 The UTSA was
intended to "codif[y] the basic principles of common law trade secret
protection."' 4 After the UTSA was initially enacted in 1985, there was
some uncertainty as to whether customer lists would continue to be trade
secrets under the law because the definition of a trade secret did not
specifically include customer lists.15 The case of American Paper &
8

Id.

9 Id.
10

Nowogroski, 137 Wash. 2d at 427.

11Id.

12 Id. at 438 (citing American Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 213 Cal. App. 3d 622

(1989)). The court found that an insurance company's customer list of policyholders was a
protected trade secret protected by Uniform Trade Secrets Act and that solicitation by
former employee constituted misappropriation within meaning of the Act. Id.
The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a "trade secret" as "information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process." Unif. Trade Secrets
Act § 1 (4) (1990).
13 Id. at 438.
14Silberberg and Lardiere, supra note 5 at 487.
'5 Hartley & Hartley, When Are Customer Lists Trade Secrets in California,
(1998),
available at: http://www.hartley.comltradesct.htm. See also supra note 10 and
accompanying text. Compare Comment (b) with § 757 of the Restatement of Torts, which
describes a trade secret as:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be
a formula, a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating
or preserving materials, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS,

Comment (b) § 757.
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Packaging Products v. Kirgan'6 eliminated this concern, however, when
the court held that customer lists could be considered
a "compilation" and,
17
therefore, a trade secret as defined by the UTSA.
a
Generally, any confidential information that gives one's business 18
competitive advantage may constitute a legally protectable trade secret.
Whether a customer list is protected as a trade secret depends on whether
the information is not known or readily ascertainable and whether the
information derives value from reasonable secrecy efforts. 19 More
particularly, courts consider the following factors in determining whether
informAtion constitutes a protectable trade secret: (1) the extent to which
the information is known outside of the employer's business; (2) the extent
to which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; (3)
the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to the employer and its
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by the employer
in developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 20 No one
factor is necessarily more determinative than the others, but if an employer
cannot prove substantial investment in his or her compilation of customer
information, he or she is not likely to prevail on a claim of trade secret
misappropriation.2'
Trade secret protection does not generally extend to customer lists
where the information is readily ascertainable.22 Whether customer
information is generally known or readily ascertainable is a question of
fact.23 An employee's general familiarity with the information relating to
183 Cal. App. 3d 1318 (1986).
Id. See also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18 H.B. Naylor, Greenberg Pegden, P.C., Protecting You Trade Secrets: Customer
16
17

Lists and Other Compilationsof Information, Volume 14, Issue I (Jan. 1999), availableat:
http://www.gpsolaw.com/newsl l.htm.
19 Nowogroski, 137 Wash. 2d at 435 (citing RCW 19.108.010 (4) (a), (b)).
20 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) oF TORTS, Comment (b) § 757 (1939).
21 H.B. Naylor, Greenberg Pegden, P.C., Protecting Your Trade Secrets: Customer
Lists and Other Compilationsof Information, Volume 14, Issue I (Jan. 1999), availableat:
http://www.gpsolaw.com/newsl 1.htm.
22 Nowogroski, 137 Wash. 2d at 441 (citing Boeing, 108 Wash. 2d at 49-50); National
Sch. Studios, Inc. v. Superior Photo Serv., Inc., 40 Wash.2d 263, 273 (1952) (stating no
trade secret where customer's identity well known or readily ascertainable); Jewett-Gorrie
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Visser, 12 Wash. App. 707 (1975) (permitting employee to solicit
customers if readily ascertainable even if knowledge acquired working for ex-employer).
See also Zoecon Industries v. American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th Cir.
1983) (stating customer lists of readily ascertainable names and addresses not protected as
trade secrets); American Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d
1318, 1326 (1986) (concluding customer list not trade secret because comprised of
information readily ascertainable to others in trade or business)
23 NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 252 (1985) (citing Zoecon Industries v.
American Stockman Tag Co., 713 F.2d 1174, 1179 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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"the former employer's costs, prices, productivity, revenues, profits,
products, customers, and suppliers" is typically classified as a matter which
is generally known to a person involved with a business. 24 Therefore, if
prospective customers for a particular product or service are readily
identifiable, their identities do not constitute a trade secret.2 In contrast, specialized customer information that cannot be easily
duplicated may be sufficiently valuable and secret to qualify as a trade
secret. 26 For example, in NCH Corporation v. Broyles,27 the plaintiff
corporation produced route books to facilitate solicitation of orders for its
employees. 28 Each page of the route books was marked "confidential" and
contained not only the customers' names and addresses but also the
"identity of the person to be contacted at each customer's location, a
detailed sales history revealing products purchased, the quantities
purchased, the container sizes, the prices paid, and the frequency of
purchases. 29 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that the evidence supported the conclusion that the information was more
extensive than what is "generally known or readily ascertainable," even
though some of the information contained in the route books could be
acquired from other sources.3 °
III. HISTORY OF THE "MEMORY RULE" AND RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
The Second Restatement of Agency states, in pertinent part, "the
agent is entitled to use general information concerning the method of
business of the principal and the names of the customers retained in his
memory, if not acquired in violation of his duty as agent."'3' This is the socalled "memory rule."' 32 This rule implies that although an agent cannot
use copies of written memoranda concerning the employer's customers in
subsequent employment, he or she is not precluded from using the names
of customers retained in his memory.33 Courts are more likely to conclude
24

Randall Scott Hetrick, Employee "Head Knowledge" and the Alabama Trade

Secrets Act, 47 ALA. L. REv. 513, 535 (1996); see also Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v.
May, 272 111.
App. 3d 580, 587 (concluding employee's general knowledge not trade
secret).
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §42 (f) (1995).
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §42 (f)
(1995).
27 749 F.2d 247, 247 (5th Cir. 1985).
28 Id. at 249.
29 Id. at 252.
30 Id. (concluding former employee under duty not to use route book).
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1958).
32 See id.
33 See id. The Restatement refines its position by stating that it is unfair conduct to
secure a position primarily for the purpose of ascertaining business methods of the
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that particular information is a trade secret if the employee misappropriates
some physical form of the information such as written blueprints, plans, or
lists of customers. 34 Although information retained in the employee's
memory may be less likely to be regarded as a trade secret absent evidence
of intentional memorization, the inference is not conclusive.35
Many courts have wrestled with the issue of whether a former
employee who used memorized information misappropriated his former
employer's trade secrets.36 In Peace v. Conway,37 former employees of a
hair replacement business used their memories to recreate employer's
custom& lists and to solicit business from those customers. 38 The
employees did not take any documents or use property that belonged to the
employer for contacting customers and non-compete covenants had not
been executed. 39 The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the employees
did not use "improper methods" of interfering with their former employer's
hair replacement contracts. n° The court concluded that, " it is not unusual
in the business world for an employee to leave his or her employment and
to start a competing business", and "inevitably customers of the former
employer will desire to continue to deal with the former employee in the
new business". 4' Conversely, in Allen v. Johar,Inc.,42 the Supreme Court
of Arkansas ruled that a former employee's solicitation of the customers of
his former employer was prohibited under Arkansas Trade Secrets Law,
even though the employee did not sign a written non-competition
agreement and used only his memory to contact the customers.4 3
employer for a competitor's use or for the purpose of memorizing names, not as incidental
to the employment, but primarily for later competition. Id.
34 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 (1995) (stating that
systematic attempts to memorize information will not insulate former employees from
liability).
3Id.

36 See supra notes 30-33.
17

246 Va. 280 (1993).

38

Id.

39

Id.

40 Id. "Improper methods may include violence, threats or intimidation, bribery,

unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, defamation, duress, undue
influence, misuse of inside or confidential information, or breach of a fiduciary
relationship." Id. at 281.
41 Id. at 282.
42

308 Ark. 45 (1992).

43 See id. at 50.

"Whether the customer information used was written down or
memorized is immaterial, and the proper issue is whether information can be protected as a
trade secret." Id. The court also stated, "customer lists that have been obtained through use
of a business effort and the expenditure of time and money that are not readily ascertainable
and are kept confidential are given protection as a trade secret." Id. at 49. The dissenting
justices held that a customer list should not be protected unless it is reduced to a writing. Id
at 52. The dissent also felt that the only practical step the employer can make to protect a
list not in written form is to enter into a confidentiality agreement with the employee. Id.
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Recent decisions indicate that courts are affording more trade secret
protection to employers than they have in the past regarding a prior
employee's ability to solicit to former customers with which they have
personal contacts. 44 In Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling,45 a 1986 California
case, the California Court of Appeals held that as a matter of law,
employees of an accounting firm did not engage in unfair competition by
using a company rolodex to acquire the addresses of clients of the firm for
whom they had provided services, in order to mail those clients an
announcement of the opening of their new firm.46 The court held that a
former employee was permitted to do business with his or her former
employer's customers with whom he or she became personally acquainted
and developed a business relationship while formerly employed. '47 The
court stated that the defendants could not be compelled to "wipe clean the
slate of their memories. 48 The court's reasoning in the Moss case was
subsequently questioned in Morlife, Inc. v. Perry,4 9 where the Court of
Appeals stated that:
[tihere is no legitimate reason for characterizing
differently the conduct of a former employee who uses
customer information personally developed for the
employer during the period of employment from the use
of the very same information developed by a coworker
who had no customer contact. Creating an artificial
distinction between the conduct of these two employees
under the rubric of commercial impracticality in not being
able to "wipe clean" one former employee's memory
constitutes an unjustified abandonment of legitimate
regulation of competitive activity, and ignores the
paramount interest in protecting information meeting the
definitional criteria of a trade secret.5 °

44 See NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 247 (5th Cir. 1985); see also American
Credit Incemnity Co. v. Sacks, 213 Cal. App. 3d 622, 626-31 (1989) (holding former
employee's letter and subsequent phone calls announcing new employment a went beyond
professional announcement and amounted to solicitation).
45 179 Cal. App. 3d 124 (1986).
46 Id. at 126.
47 Id. at 129. See also Avocado Sales Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal. App. 627, 634 (1932)
(stating lawful for salesman to sell avocados to retail customers whom salesman had
serviced for former employer); Theodore v. Williams, 44 Cal. App. 34, 37-9 (1919) (stating
lawful for driver to announce new employer by driving along old route in truck marked
with his name and new employer's name). But see Klamath-Orleans Lumber, Inc. v. Miller,
87 Cal. App. 3d 458, 462-66, (1978) (stating use by memory of extensive customer list to
permit selective solicitation held unfair competition).
48 Moss, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 124 (1986).
h
49 55 Cal. App. 4"
1514, 1514 (1997).
50 id. at 1526.
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IV. ED NOWOGROSKI INSURANCE, INC. V. RUCKER
In Ed Nowogroski Insurance, Inc. v. Rucker, the Supreme Court of
Washington considered the issue of whether information that meets the
UTSA definition of a trade secret loses its protection because it has been
memorized rather than taken in written form. 51 Ed Nowogroski Insurance,
Inc. accused its former employees Rucker, Rieck, and Kiser of
misappropriating the company's trade secrets by keeping and using
confidential client lists and other information.52 Rieck testified that was
familiar nough with his top fifty clients that he did not need summaries or
other aids to solicit business because he had memorized the customers'
personal information.53 The plaintiff argued that the form of information
was irrelevant and that the defendant employee should be liable for
misappropriation of the customer lists whether written or memorized.54
The trial court found that Reick, Kiser, and Rucker violated the UTSA
because they misappropriated their employer's trade secrets either by
taking or refusing to return summaries of insurance, company records, and
other confidential information.5 5 The court, however, concluded that the
plaintiff would not recover additional damages for the memorized
information because an employee does not violate the UTSA by using
information from his head to solicit business from his former employer.56
The Washington Court of Appeals held that there was no legal distinction
between written and memorized information under the Washington UTSA,
and said that the Act focuses on the nature of the information and not the
57
form in which it exists. The defendants appealed.58
The Washington Supreme Court noted that there is a split of
authority among the jurisdictions on the issue but stressed that the trend
seems to be that it is the character of the information--not the manner of its
appropriation--that determines whether the customer list is a trade secret.59
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Washington Supreme Court cited
Callman's treatise on unfair competition, 6° in which the author cited cases
51 Nowogroski, 137 Wash. 2d at 436 (stating question of law dependent on
interpretation of statute and, thus, subject to de novo review).
52 See id. at 429.
53 See id at 433.
54 See id. at 434.
55 Id. at 432-34.
56 See Nowogroski, 137 Wash.2d at 435.
57 See id. at 94 1.
58

See id.

59 Id. at 446, Compare DeGiorgio v. Megabyte Int'l, Inc., 266 Ga. 539, 540 (1996)

(holding that personal knowledge regarding customers not forbidden under Trade Secrets
Act) with Stampede, 272 111.
App. 3d at 590 (1995) (holding trade secret misappropriated by
physical copying or by memorization).
60 Callman, Rudolf, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks, & Monopolies, 4 th
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holding that the modern trend is to eliminate the distinction between
written and memorized information. 61 Rudolf Callman recognized that
many older cases drew a distinction between written customer lists and
those committed to memory but stated that the distinction between written
and memorized information should not be encouraged. 62 The Washington
Supreme Court concluded that the form of information, whether written or
memorized, is immaterial under the UTSA.6 3
V. DAMAGES FOR TRADE SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION
Injunctive relief is one form of damages that employers often seek
when alleging that a former employee has misappropriated their trade
secret. 64 Generally an injunction should only last as long as is necessary to
eliminate the commercial advantage that an ex-employee would obtain
through trade secret misappropriation.6 5 An injunction should terminate
when the trade secret becomes known to competitors. 66 Therefore, an
injunction should not be issued if the trade secret is no longer truly a secret
and is known by competitors.67 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act also
provides for damages for trade secret misappropriation and for attorneys'
fees if bad faith can be proven.68

Ed. (Callaghan 1981).
61 Nowogroski, 137 Wash.2d at 448.
62 Id. (stating form of information and manner in which obtained unimportant). The
nature of the relationship and the employee's conduct should be determinative factors. Id.
63 Id. at 449. The court stated, "whether the information is on a CD, a blueprint, a
film, a recording, a hard paper copy or memorized by the employee, the inquiry is whether
it meets the definition of a trade secret under the Act and whether it was misappropriated."
Id.
64 Amer. Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1326
(1986) (citing Enos v. Harmon, 157 Cal. App.2d 746, 750 (1958)).
65 Amer. Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1326
(1986).
66

Id.

Id.
68 Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § § 3-4. Damages can include both the actual loss
67

caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is
not taken into account in computing actual loss. Id. If willful and malicious
misappropriation exists, the court may award exemplary damages in an amount not
exceeding twice any award made under subsection (a). U.T.S.A. § 3. If (i) a claim of
misappropriation is made in bad faith, (ii) a motion to terminate an injunction is made or
resisted in bad faith, or (iii) willful and malicious misappropriation exists, the court may
award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. U.T.S.A. § 4.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The requirement that a former employee misappropriate a physical
object before there can be the misappropriation of a customer list is
becoming obsolete. 69 Recent court decisions clearly indicate that the trend
is to eliminate the distinction between a customer list committed to
memory and one that is physically taken.7 ° Using memorization to rebuild
a trade secret does not transform that trade secret from confidential
information into non-confidential information.7' It should not make a
difference whether the employee has possession of a physical list or has
committed the list to memory because the result is the same: trade secret
misappropriation. The "memory rule" may truly become just a memory,
and the courts should adhere to the logical conclusion that it is possible for
a customer list to be misappropriated through memorization alone.
Rhonda De Vincent

69 H.B. Naylor, Customer Lists and Other Compilations of Information, Volume 14,
Issue 1 (Jan. 1999), availableat: http://www.gpsolaw.com/newsl l.htm.
70 See e.g. Nowogroski, 137 Wash.2d at 448 (explaining that Uniform Trade Secrets

Act does not distinguish between written and memorized information); Allen, 308 Ark. 45,
(1992) (holding immaterial distinction between written and memorized customer
information), Morlife, 56 Cal. App. 4 th at 1526 (1997) (holding view that former employee
should not be compelled to wipe clean slate of memory not legitimate). Id.
7 See Stampede, 272 lll.App.3d at 590 (physical appropriation not required for
misappropriation of customer list). Id.

